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Abstract
If life insurers are not permitted to use genetic test results
in underwriting, they may face adverse selection. It is
sometimes claimed that applicants will choose abnor-
mally high sums insured as a form of financial gamble,
possibly financed by life settlement companies (LSCs).
The latter possibility is given some credence by the
recent experience of “stranger‐originated life insurance”
(STOLI) in the United States. We examine these claims,
and find them unconvincing for four reasons. First,
apparently high mortality implies surprisingly high
probabilities of surviving for decades, so the gamble faces
long odds. Second, LSCs would have to adopt a different
business model, involving much longer time horizons.
Third, STOLI is being effectively dealt with by the U.S.
courts. Fourth, the gamble would be predicated upon a
deep understanding of the genetic epidemiology, which
is evolving, subject to uncertain biases, and cannot
predict the emergence of effective treatments.
KEYWORDS
adverse selection, genetic tests, life settlement, one‐shot gamble,
stranger‐originated life insurance
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits
use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or
adaptations are made.
© 2020 The Authors. Risk Management and Insurance Review published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Risk and
Insurance Association
1 | INTRODUCTION
1.1 | Genetic testing
Since genetic tests began to enter clinical practice in the 1990s their use by life and health
insurers in underwriting has been controversial (Joly et al., 2010).
In one sense this was perhaps surprising, and the reaction of life insurers at the time does
suggest that some were taken by surprise. For many years, life insurers had routinely included
family medical histories in underwriting. This could show an applicant to be at risk of an
inherited disorder. For example:
(a) A man whose father had died of Huntington disease was at 50% risk of having inherited the
gene mutation responsible for it.
(b) A woman whose mother and sister had died of breast cancer was at some risk of having
inherited a gene mutation that could lead to breast cancer.
The first example is relatively straightforward, because a mutation arising in one specific
gene is the sole cause of Huntington disease (Bates et al., 2002). The second example is com-
plicated, because only a small proportion of breast cancer is caused by inherited genes, and
there is more than one candidate gene (Eeles et al., 2004). This family history could have a
genetic origin, but it could also have occurred spontaneously.
Genetic testing, meaning the direct examination of the DNA sequence, appeared merely to
resolve the ambiguity inherent in knowing only the family history. Both individuals above
could learn, definitively, whether they had or had not inherited a mutation responsible for their
family history.1
What life insurers had perhaps failed to anticipate, in the 1990s, was the extent to which
genetic test results would come to be regarded, in many quarters, as worthy of some legal
protection against being used as a basis for discrimination. From the perspective of insurers, the
rationale for this may not be obvious (and hence the controversy), but the strength of public
sentiment is undeniable. See Prince (2019) for an excellent account of the policy debates and
outcomes that have emerged in the UK, Sweden, Australia, and Canada. Broadly speaking, in
all cases there has been pressure to bar insurers from using genetic test results, counter‐pressure
from insurers, and a variety of outcomes. Perhaps the most salient example is the UK, because
government and insurers quite soon reached an accommodation, which has been stable for
nearly 25 years.
1.2 | Adverse selection
Claims by insurers to have a “right to underwrite” (see Thomas, 2017 and references therein)
turned out to have limited traction (see Prince, 2019) so one of the main reasons advanced by
insurers to be allowed to use genetic test results was their exposure to the risk of adverse
selection, if they were not.
1This is broadly true of the Huntington example, but to a much more limited extent of the breast cancer example, for
reasons which need not detain us.
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Adverse selection, as actuaries and insurers understand it, arises when an applicant for
insurance is able to withhold adverse information relevant to the risk. Whether or not it matters
depends on the magnitude of the difference in risk indicated by the withheld information.
(a) The difference between the mortality of males and females is comparable to the difference
between the mortality of smokers (of cigarettes) and nonsmokers. Insurers for many years
charged different premiums to males and females, but saw no need to distinguish between
smokers and nonsmokers. And, when such a distinction was introduced (in the UK, in the
1980s) it was for marketing reasons, not because of fears about adverse selection (Rhodes &
Savill, 1984).2
(b) The difference between the mortality of a carrier of a Huntington disease mutation and that
of a noncarrier is extremely high, comparable to a difference of several decades of age
(Brackenridge et al., 2004). No life insurer would offer the same premiums to two persons
whose ages were several decades apart, and most would argue that to do so would present
an existential risk. From this, they would proceed to argue that genetic test results should be
allowed in underwriting.
One important difference between these two examples is that extreme differences in mor-
tality tend to be associated with large differences in population size. There are many fewer
people age 90 than age 20, and many fewer carriers of high‐risk mutations than noncarriers.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis upon which insurers rely, in pointing to the threat from ad-
verse selection, is that persons who know they are at higher risk and who do not have to
disclose it will be incentivized to buy more life insurance (Thomas, 2017). In this respect, we
introduce a distinction between two kinds of adverse selection.
(a) Precautionary adverse selection: The applicant's privileged knowledge gives them an in-
centive to ensure that their reasonable need for life insurance is met. This would lead to
more life insurance being sold to higher risk persons, but not to unusually large amounts of
cover for each person. There is some evidence that adverse selection of this kind may
happen. Lane et al. (2015) reported that many cancer genetic counselors in Canada advise
patients to put life insurance in place before taking a genetic test.
(b) Speculative adverse selection: The applicant's knowledge that they can take out life insurance
at less than its true cost gives them such a strong incentive that they go further, and take out
sums insured well in excess of any actual need.
The first of these is life insurance meeting a normal need. The second is life insurance as a
financial gamble.
In the debate on genetics and insurance, speculative adverse selection is often invoked as
being a likely outcome. For example, in a report to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries on the
possible costs of a ban on insurer access, Howard (2014) assumed that 75% of individuals who
tested positive would subsequently purchase an additional $900,000 of life insurance (compared
with an assumed average before the test of $100,000).
2Once a single insurer had introduced the distinction, it induced fear of adverse selection among its competitors, where
before there had been none.
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It is also sometimes suggested that third parties will finance the purchase of policies. For
example, a Statement on Genetic Testing and Insurance (Canadian Institute of Actuaries, 2014)
issued in conjunction with the above report said:
…anti‐selection should increase in provinces which allow secondary insurance mar-
kets. Currently, Québec, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick allow sec-
ondary purchasing and selling of individual life insurance policies. In such markets,
an opportunistic insurance policy purchasing program could be constructed to en-
courage individuals who have positively tested for genetic conditions to purchase
insurance policies and sell the policies to this program in exchange for cash.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the credibility of such suggestions that life insurance
might be framed as a speculative product. In particular we ask three questions.
(a) Would individuals who have an adverse genetic test result be likely, as a result, to take out
abnormally large life insurance policies?
(b) Would third parties be likely or able to finance large‐scale speculative adverse selection?
(c) Does genetic epidemiology provide sufficient certainty about the risks to justify the outlay of
money on a gamble, as in (a) or (b) above?
Our interest is not confined to any particular jurisdiction, but since the greatest develop-
ments in the secondary life insurance market have taken place in the United States
(Gatzert, 2010), most of our examples will be drawn from there.
1.3 | The secondary life insurance market
A policyholder with a life insurance policy can sell it for cash to a third party (investor) in the
secondary life insurance market. The investor takes responsibility for paying future premiums,
and receives the sum insured when the insured person dies. This can be attractive to the
investor if the insured person is in poor health, and attractive to the insured person if the
surrender value on offer from the insurer is low. We identify four main strands of the secondary
market (see Braun et al., 2018; Guttery et al., 2012).
(a) Viatical companies (VCs) buy policies from insureds with very short life expectancies (LEs),
typically <2 years.
(b) Life settlement companies (LSCs) buy policies from older insureds, typically over age 65,
with LEs of about 15 years or less.
(c) Stranger‐originated life insurance (STOLI) follows the LSC business model but originates
new policies intended to be sold to the investor rather than seeking out existing
policyholders.3
3Unfortunately, the acronym “STOLI” has also been widely used for “stranger‐owned life insurance,” as a search of the
Society of Actuaries' website with keyword “STOLI” confirms (searched on February 27, 2020). Stranger‐owned life
insurance encompasses all secondary market sales, and therefore includes the wholly legitimate business of VCs and
LSCs, who purchase policies originally bought by individuals with bona fide insurance motivations. Stranger‐originated
life insurance, in contrast, refers to a less legitimate subset of secondary market sales, where a speculative investor
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(d) Premium financing companies lend money to finance new life insurance policies but do not
purchase them from the policyholder.
The concern expressed in the quote in Section 1.2 from the Canadian Institute of Actuaries
(2014) report is about a new form of STOLI, where life insurance would be originated on
individuals who have tested positive for genetic predispositions, but who may still have LEs of
several decades. In this long‐term aspect, it would differ from the extant business models at
(a)–(d) above, which involve individuals with LEs of about 15 years or less.
1.4 | Plan of this paper
First we review the main features that define the epidemiology of a genetic disorder, with
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM) as an example (the details are in the Appendix). Next, we
introduce the idea of a “one‐shot gamble” (Thomas, 2017) in order to discuss speculative
adverse selection. We extend this discussion to LSCs and, more generally, STOLI. Then we
review some features of the epidemiology of genetic disorders, and its reliability as a basis for
investing in a financial gamble. We finish with our conclusions.
2 | BASIC FEATURES OF SINGLE ‐GENE GENETIC
DISORDERS
2.1 | When is an inherited disorder of relevance to life insurance?
Here we briefly list the main features that might make a single‐gene genetic disorder relevant
for life insurance (see Pasternak, 2005 for genetical matters, and Macdonald, 2003 for features
relevant to insurance).
(a) A small number of potentially fatal disorders are caused by abnormal variations in the DNA
of a single gene, called “deleterious variants,”4 which we abbreviate to “DV.”
(b) Natural selection acts to remove DVs from the population, so they persist only if their
physiological effects, called the “phenotype,” are delayed until after reproductive ages. This
also means that they are delayed until a carrier is economically active, and might buy life
insurance. Only such “late‐onset” disorders really matter for life insurance, and they are
relatively rare.5
(c) With exceptions (which we ignore) a child inherits two copies of each gene, one from each
parent. If both must have DVs to give rise to the disorder, it is recessively inherited. Such
disorders tend to manifest early in life and are not significant for life insurance. Those that
are significant must have late onset (see (b) above) and dominant inheritance, meaning that
inheriting a DV from just one parent may give rise to the disorder.
provides finance to an individual with no bona fide insurance motivations to buy a policy, and then purchases it from
the insured.
4We understand that the term “mutation,” which we used until now, is falling out of favor among geneticists.
5Exceptionally, early‐onset disorders might have some relevance if the insurance is on the life of a child.
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(d) Genotype does not guarantee phenotype. The probability that the disorder will appear,
during a DV carrier's lifetime, is called the “lifetime penetrance.” It is usually <100%. More
generally, the probability that the disorder will appear by any given age is called the “age‐
related penetrance,” and this is important for life insurance. It must not be very high at
early‐to‐middle ages, so life insurance can be purchased normally, but it must be high
enough at middle‐to‐late ages so that, for a significant proportion of insured persons, the
disorder develops and death occurs while life insurance is still in force.
To summarize, the genetic disorders of significance for life insurance are dominantly in-
herited single‐gene disorders, of severe effect, but whose effects are delayed until middle age. As
an example, we will use HCM, an inherited disorder of the heart muscle. We describe it briefly
in the Appendix. It meets our criteria, because it is relatively common, mostly has high pe-
netrance at young adult ages, and presents significantly elevated mortality risk.
2.2 | Family history and genetic testing
Before DNA could be sequenced directly, single‐gene disorders could be recognized by the
patterns of inheritance seen in extended families, or “pedigrees” (Cummings, 2015). Broadly
speaking, it would be very unusual for two parents to carry the same rare DV, so each child of a
parent who carried a DV would inherit it with probability 1/2, independently of their siblings
(by Mendel's laws).
By asking about family history of disease, life insurers have long been able to assess tolerably
well the probability that an applicant might carry a DV6 (Brackenridge et al., 2004). Therefore,
the underwriting of genetic disorders did not begin with the advent of DNA sequencing in the
1990s. Rather, DNA sequencing made it possible to say for sure that a person at risk of having
inherited a DV either had or had not inherited it. It is important, for insurance purposes, to
distinguish between “diagnostic” and “predictive” genetic testing.
(a) Once symptoms of a disorder have appeared, a genetic test may confirm the diagnosis, and
identifying the precise mutation may be important for treatment (in which case, the test
may also be prognostic).
(b) A genetic test taken by a completely healthy person, free of any symptoms, is purely
predictive of future risk. It may also be prognostic, if prophylactic treatment for the disorder
is possible. An example is inherited breast cancer. Genetic testing may reveal a deleterious
mutation in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene decades before a single cancerous cell exists, and
prophylactic treatment (mastectomy) may be considered.
3 | THE ONE ‐SHOT GAMBLE
In this section, we explore in more detail the possibility of individuals using life insurance as a
vehicle for a financial gamble, and introduce the idea of a “one‐shot gamble.” The discussion
here will be intuitive; for mathematical details see Chapter 11 of Thomas (2017).
6Life insurers usually ask only about the medical history of an applicant's parents and siblings. Clinical geneticists and
epidemiologists might acquire much more extensive histories, over several generations.
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3.1 | Precautionary framing versus speculative framing
Life insurance is typically framed principally as a precautionary product, that is it is bought to
restore a quantum of wealth which the beneficiary loses consequent upon the death of the life
insured. Probably the most common context is that the beneficiaries are family dependants of
the life insured. But there are other possible contexts: for example, the beneficiary may be a
lender, who requires life insurance (usually paid for by the borrower) to ensure the repayment
of a loan if the borrower dies; or an employer, who requires “key person insurance” to com-
pensate business lost after the death of an employee Nie et al. (2018). In each case, there exists a
clearly identifiable prospective financial loss, so that any claim restores rather than increases
(at least in broad‐brush terms) the wealth of the beneficiary.
While the above framing as a precautionary product represents a typical view of life in-
surance, insurers ultimately cannot constrain how people view their products. Life insurance
can alternatively be framed as a speculative product; that is a bet against the insurer at a cheap
price, which is made to increase (rather than restore) the wealth of the beneficiaries. In this
framing, the quantum of cover chosen will depend principally on the terms of the insurance
(the price of the cover relative to its expected payoff). Where the terms are attractive, the
quantum of cover chosen might be greater than any precautionary need.
3.2 | The one‐shot gamble
Life insurance framed as a bet against the insurer always constitutes a one‐shot gamble. That is,
the payoff from the investment is determined by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a single
event, the death of the life insured. Customers cannot make the same bet many times, and
obtain the average result diversified across those instances; they can make the bet only once, on
a single life. Note that in this paragraph (and throughout this paper) we use the terms “gamble,”
“investment,” and “bet” interchangeably; in the present context, none of them has any moral
connotation.
In term life insurance, the single event (the death of the life during the term) is relatively
unlikely; that is, the one‐shot gamble is a gamble against long odds. Typically, this remains true
even if the life has some private information suggesting higher risk. For example, if a 30‐year‐
old life has private knowledge of HCM, the probability of dying during the term of a 25‐year
insurance is about 15% (own calculation, based on Haçarız, 2020). The life is still much more
likely to survive the term than not.
This combination of features—the inability to diversify the bet, and the long odds—make a
large gamble on term insurance unattractive for most realistic scenarios. For a large gamble to
become attractive, at least one of the following scenarios needs to be true:
(a) The gamble is diversifiable across many lives; or
(b) The odds of the gamble are relatively short.
As an example of a diversifiable gamble, if we could buy 25‐year term insurance on each of a
large number of 30‐year‐old lives with HCM as described above, but at a price which allows for
only a 5% probability of dying, then that portfolio of bets could be an attractive investment.
Although it is unlikely that any particular life will die during the term, with a large number of
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lives we can be fairly sure that close to 15% will die, compared with the 5% on which the
premiums were based.
As an example of a gamble with short odds, if we privately know we already have a terminal
illness from which we are 80% likely to die during the term of the insurance, then a one‐shot
gamble on term insurance at standard premium rates may be attractive. This is because there is
an 80% chance that our beneficiaries will receive a payout many times the premium, which we
may feel makes it worth taking the 20% risk that we shall just lose the premium.
Superficially, it may appear that the need for short odds on the one‐shot gamble might be
satisfied by choosing a whole life policy, under which a death payment will be received at some
future time with certainty. But this apparent certainty is illusory, because for a whole life policy,
receiving a death payment is not the same as “winning” the one‐shot gamble. The economic
gain to the customer at death is not the death benefit, but rather the difference between the
death benefit and the accumulated value of all the premiums paid. As the customer gets older,
this difference gets smaller; for deaths at high ages, the accumulated value of all premiums paid
may even exceed the death benefit ultimately paid. So while choosing a whole‐life policy does
increase the chance of some economic gain, the chance of a large economic gain is still small;
and the chance of an economic loss also becomes material.7
As an alternative to diversifying the insurance bet across many independent lives, the one‐
shot gamble could instead be held as part of a broader portfolio of other bets. However,
provided these other bets are independent of the life insurance, then including them can only
reduce the maximum fraction of total wealth which can sensibly be allocated to the one‐shot
gamble. So under this portfolio concept, the bet on the one‐shot gamble remains limited by its
long odds.8
The considerations above suggest that the potential for speculative adverse selection by a
single individual is in fact quite limited. This is so whether the individual has the means to pay
the premiums or must borrow from a premium financing company (see Section 1.3). Neither of
the clearly favourable scenarios—a diversifiable gamble, or a gamble with short odds—
corresponds closely to the situation of a single individual with some private genetic knowledge.
However, in principle (and subject to any applicable legal restrictions), a diversifiable gamble
might be engineered by a third party, which could assemble a group of such individuals, and
then fund the purchase of policies on all their lives. The next section considers this possibility.
4 | VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENT COMPANIES
4.1 | Motivation
In this section we consider VCs and LSCs and their business models, see Section 1.3. We are
motivated to do so by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries report (Canadian Institute of Actu-
aries, 2014) quoted in Section 1.2. We find that life insurance contracts written for long terms on
relatively young lives with a reasonable prospect of a long life seem to fall well outside any of
the existing business models. Nevertheless, we also consider the possibility of a different STOLI‐
7We ignore the possibility of dividends on the whole life policy, which are not certain, and do not negate the point that
the net benefit of the policy to the customer decreases at higher ages.
8With negative correlation between the one‐shot gamble and the other bets, some increase in the bet on the one‐shot
gamble might be justified; but there seems no obvious rationale to anticipate negative correlation.
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type business model, where a third party would finance the purchase of life insurance policies
by carriers of a DV.
4.2 | Business models
For full accounts of the origin and operation of VCs and LSCs see, for example, Ray (2000),
Doherty and Singer (2003), Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies (2006), Aspinwall et al.
(2009), Guttery et al. (2012), Braun et al. (2018), Sheridan (2019), or Braun and Xu (2020). Both
types of company profit from creating a secondary market in life insurance policies. That is,
they trade in policies that have already been issued by insurers.
VCs originated in the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) crisis in the 1980s,
when a large number of young people were suddenly faced with dramatically reduced LEs. Any
who had long‐term life insurance in place could usually obtain only a relatively low surrender
value from the insurer, which did not reflect their terminal illness. VCs purchased these policies
for cash payments in excess of the surrender value, assumed responsibility for paying the
premiums, and collected the full sum insured on death. This established the VC business
model, buying policies from persons with very short LEs, usually <2 years.9
LSCs have a similar business model but target different sectors. They accept longer expectations
of life, typically buy the policies of older persons, and seek out larger sums insured (Giaccotto
et al., 2015). Based on data from the New York State Insurance Department, 1993–2009, the same
authors reported the following, associated with the growth of the LSC market.
(a) Estimated LEs increasing from 13.99 to 31.12 months.
(b) The average sum insured increasing from $79,113 to $574,609.
Xu (2019) states that over 2011–2016, the average age at settlement was 76.3, and that “over
the last five years” the mean sum insured settled was $1.9 million with a median of $1 million.
The increase in the sums insured is particularly interesting. Giaccotto et al. (2015) say “Pur-
chasing fewer but larger [policies] saves on transactions costs.” However, this strategy is the
exact opposite of the basic principle underlying insurance, because it concentrates risk rather
than spreading risk across a large number of individuals.10
A high degree of reliance is placed on estimates of LEs which are provided by a small number of
specialist underwriting companies, called “LE providers”. In the 2000s, at least, these tended to
provide over‐optimistic (too low) estimates11 (Bauer et al., 2018; Sheridan, 2019; Xu 2020). For
LSCs in particular, the base tables in use were neither particularly reliable at high ages, nor based
on the wealthiest segment of the population, also leading to underestimated LEs (Sheridan, 2019).
Note the key features of this business model.
(a) The companies buy existing policies, they do not initiate new policies.
9In respect of AIDS itself, this business model did not survive the introduction of antiretroviral treatments.
10Sheridan (2019) described how LSCs would try to avoid concentration in particular “cohorts,” such as nonsmokers or
specific impairments.
11If LE estimates were too high, the business would not be transacted. Note the analogy between LE providers
competing to give acceptable LE estimates to LSCs and credit ratings agencies competing to give acceptable credit
ratings to structured products issued by investment banks (McLean & Nocera, 2010).
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(b) The terms involved are fairly short (very short in the case of VCs).
(c) There exists some risk of medical developments lengthening expectations of life.
(d) The companies do not depend on the life insurer mispricing the policy at issue. They target
persons whose health has deteriorated since their policies were issued.
In particular, companies operating as above have no bearing on the genetics and insurance
debate. This is so even if a company was able to use genetic test results in choosing which
policies to buy. The time horizons are short, not long, and companies do not initiate the
purchase of new contracts with very long terms and high sums insured.
At first sight, the insurers who issued the contracts originally are not affected; they need not
even know that a policy has been sold. It is often argued, however, that insurers build in
significant numbers of lapsed policies, receiving only the surrender value, in their profit cal-
culations, and that investors will not usually lapse policies they have bought (Braun et al., 2018;
Doherty & Singer, 2003). The first authors, in particular, regard the secondary market as a
benefit, if it will “…keep incumbent insurers from the unfair, and ultimately unworkable,
practice of using high lapse expectations to underprice certain policies.”
4.3 | STRANGER‐ORIGINATED LIFE INSURANCE
4.3.1 | STOLI in North America
Contrast the business model in the previous section with the hypothetical scenario of a third
party monetizing the one‐shot gamble by identifying individuals at increased long‐term risk and
then funding them to take out new life insurance policies. This “STOLI” overcomes the
drawback of the one‐shot gamble by diversifying across many lives. Glasgow et al. (2018)
describes how STOLI emerged in the United States from 2000 onward, with the following
features, being a twist on the basic business model of LSCs.
(a) STOLI investors typically targetted healthy elderly people, who would pass medical underwriting.
They often used brokers in key geographical areas, since open advertising was impossible.
(b) LE estimates were obtained from the LE providers, as for a LSC.
(c) STOLI policies were very large, usually over $2 million and often in the range $5–$10 million.
(d) Investors often took out multiple policies on the same individual, from different insurers.
(e) While the selected persons could pass medical underwriting, the level of fraud perpetrated
to pass financial underwriting, and to take out multiple policies on one life, was high.
(f) A very large volume of STOLI business was written. Glasgow et al. (2018) mention one
single scheme (“the Coventry program”) which generated about 7,000 policies with sums
insured of about $20 billion.
(g) Life insurers only realized what these policies were in the financial crisis of 2008, when
some investors were unable to pay the premiums.
Essentially STOLI is a bet on when the insured individual would die made by investors who
have no insurable interest.12 Braun et al. (2018) shows that the volume of STOLI business
12In most jurisdictions, the initial purchaser of a life insurance policy must have an “insurable interest” in the insured
person. That is, they must stand in some relationship to them such that they will suffer financial harm were the insured
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increased steeply until about 2008, then declined equally steeply. This was not a coincidence.
It represented an attempt to securitize mortality risk, on an industrial scale, in an era when
securitization and distribution of risk was seen as a panacea13 (McLean & Nocera, 2010).
The type of policy was important. Conventional term and whole life insurance, under which
reserves are accrued, impose a “…punitive return drag for an investor” (Sheridan, 2019). This is
because conventional contracts mandate substantial premiums in the early years, which accrue
at the rates of return granted under the policy; these rates are typically much lower than the
rate of return anticipated by the investor from the “bet” on mortality exposure. Therefore
investors purchased universal life contracts, choosing maximum death benefits with little or no
savings element. It is unclear if STOLI business would be viable based on conventional
contracts.
Barring outright fraud, STOLI policyholders have to pass the insurer's medical under-
writing, which will be stricter for large sums insured, so at first sight it is difficult to see where
the investors' profit is. Indeed, according to Sheridan (2019) STOLI investors did not realize that
by targetting the wealthiest they were also targetting the healthiest, and it is not clear that the
STOLI business was profitable.14
Below, we consider two aspects of STOLI: its legality; and whether the arithmetic is likely to
work in the case of genetic disorders.
4.3.2 | STOLI and the Law
The whole point of STOLI is that an investor wishes to avoid the legal requirement that anyone
taking out a life insurance policy on someone else's life has to have an insurable interest in that
person. The investor suffers no financial loss or harm on the death of the insured person, so the
policy is purely an investment.
Regulators in the United States have moved to curb STOLI business, and life insurers,
mainly in the United States, have in many cases been successful in having STOLI policies
declared void in court. Glasgow et al. (2018) describe these developments.
(a) Two regulatory bodies introduced model acts, which have since been adopted in many
states. Their effect was to require certain disclosures that would alert an insurer to possible
STOLI business.15
person to die. Examples include dependent relatives, lending institutions or businesses in which the insured person is a
key employee. The purpose of insurable interest is to avoid the situation where the initial purchaser of a life insurance
policy is interested only in the death of the policyholder. Most jurisdictions nevertheless permit the initial purchaser to
sell the policy to a third party at a later date. For further discussion of the insurable interest doctrine as applied to
secondary life insurance markets, see Richmond (2012) and Swisher (2015).
13Aspinwall et al. (2009) explains mortality risk to readers who are familiar with credit derivatives, and the larger part of
the book is devoted to the structured and derivative products that can be created out of life settlements.
14One possible explanation is that insurers have built lapse assumptions into premium rates; if too few policies are
lapsed, the insurer makes a loss and that is the STOLI investor's profit. Sheridan (2019) calls this the “lapse support
meme” and writes “Premium rates varied so widely by carrier, vintage, product type and premium class that investors
lacked a baseline from which to calibrate the extent of the lapse assumptions and determine if they were a viable cause
of this magical STOLI value creation or not.”
15One model act described the business as “viatical settlements” and the other as “life settlements,” so the older
terminology is perpetuated (Glasgow et al., 2018).
HAÇARıZ ET AL. | 11
(b) A large amount of case law has accumulated. Glasgow et al. (2018) said “Generally
speaking, insurers did well in this litigation. Indeed, during the time period from 2009 to
2012, huge numbers of policies were invalidated and new pro‐insurer STOLI decisions
seemed to be issued by courts across the country almost every week.” Xu (2019) reports that
126 legal cases, relating to STOLI, were decided between 2010 and 2017.
Given that STOLI investors have typically underestimated LEs (Glasgow et al., 2018;
Sheridan, 2019), also a feature of VCs and LSCs, as noted by Giaccotto et al. (2015), it is
expected that large numbers of claims will emerge in the future and many of them will be
successfully challenged by insurers. Braun et al. (2018) says: “Over the past decade, most states
also passed laws to ban STOLIs. Today, STOLIs are a pariah in the life settlement industry.”
Since it is the gambling aspect of STOLI that the U.S. courts found objectionable, and that
would be the same if the basis of the gamble was genetic test results, we must presume that
such an enterprise based on genetic test results, in the United States, would be at high risk of
legal challenge.
The Canadian Institute of Actuaries (2014) report suggested that STOLI could be used to exploit
genetic tests in Canada. The legal position in Canada is similar to that in the United States: an
insurable interest is required when a life insurance contract is written, but the contract can then be
assigned to an entity who has no insurable interest (Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies, 2006).
However, there is no evidence in the literature of STOLI activity in Canada.
4.3.3 | STOLI and genetic tests
The key point here is that STOLI based on genetic test results would be completely different
from the LSC business model, adopted and expanded by STOLI investors after 2000. Essentially
we would be adding a fifth, new, business model to the life settlement market. Taking HCM as
an example, we note the following obstacles to STOLI based on genetic test results.
(a) Although mortality rates associated with HCM are much greater than normal, the prob-
abilities of surviving for a long time are surprisingly high. Haçarız (2020) noted that if
HCM‐related mortality was 1% per annum (a widely cited figure) the probability of sur-
viving for 40 years was about 2/3. Using the more up‐to‐date rate of 0.55% per annum (from
Haçarız, 2020) the probability of surviving for 40 years is about 4/5.
(b) Consequently, the STOLI investor would have to buy insurance policies with very long
terms, to obtain any substantial excess probability of a payout, and payouts would extend
into the distant future. Meanwhile, the investor's premium outgo is continuing. This is very
unlike the normal LSC business model.
(c) Because of the long policy terms, the investor is vulnerable to future advances in medicine
that could destroy its profits at a stroke. The more the investor focuses on a particular
disorder, the more concentrated this risk is.
(d) The investor profits only if the life insurer underpriced the policies, because of the missing
information (but see Footnote 14). But if the insurer has priced the policies cautiously,
precisely because of limited information or selection bias in the available information, the
investor's advantage may be illusory. We explore selection bias in the next section.
(e) To implement such a scheme, the investor would have to locate potential purchasers. It would be
unwise to assume that this could not be done; one characteristic of STOLI investors seems to be
12 | HAÇARıZ ET AL.
ingenuity. But in the United States, the STOLI target market was a small proportion of in-
dividuals, those with sufficient wealth. In respect of a genetic test, the target market is also small,
those with an adverse test result. If both requirements had to be met to make the business
worthwhile, the target market would be the intersection of two small populations.
(f) Suppose investors do assemble a pool of carriers of HCM‐related DVs who do not have a clinical
diagnosis of HCM, which would be disclosable to an insurer. Some may have a family history,
some may know only a genetic test result. Then the investor would have to finance the purchase
of large life insurance policies, keeping within insurers' financial underwriting limits.
(g) Finally, perhaps, the investor would offload the long‐term risk onto other investors, for
example, by packaging the policies into a structured product, like an insurance‐backed
bond. Ironically, the main investors looking for yield over very long terms might be life
insurers themselves.
Crucially, the entire basis of the gamble, which we emphasise is quite different from STOLI
based on the LSC business model, rests on the investor's understanding of the risk associated
with a genetic test result. The only source of that understanding is the genetic epidemiological
literature, which we consider next.
5 | GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY
5.1 | How genetic epidemiology evolves
The epidemiology of a single‐gene disorder typically evolves over time in the following way (see
Cummings, 2015; Haçarız, 2020).
(a) The disorder may be recognized as Mendelian from studies of families with exceptional
numbers of cases. Prevalence estimates are, in the absence of genotyping, based on clini-
cally diagnosed cases. Mortality rates may be based on strongly selected populations, such
as persons referred to clinics because of severe symptoms, introducing selection bias.
(b) Over time, variants in particular genes are associated with the disorder.
(c) Penetrance estimates of the identified mutations are obtained, based on the presence of
clinically diagnosed individuals within families. Such studies are subject to ascertainment
bias (see Hodge, 2002 and references therein) since only families with affected members
come to the attention of researchers.16
(d) Over time, studies in larger and less selected populations may take place. Studies of pre-
valence in unselected populations are particularly important, since they may reveal sig-
nificant differences between the prevalence of DVs and the prevalence of clinical diagnoses
(that is, the presence of “silent” DVs). This in turn may throw light on penetrance estimates
subject to ascertainment bias.
(e) If effective treatment or prevention is available, the primary purpose of genetic testing is to
identify carriers of DVs so they can be treated. Then genetic testing may significantly reduce
mortality.
16Ascertainment bias refers to the recruitment of families, rather than individuals, into a study.
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5.2 | An example: HCM
We describe HCM briefly in the Appendix. Here we highlight two ways in which the epide-
miology of HCM has evolved, and is still evolving (see Haçarız et al., 2020).
5.2.1 | Falling estimates of HCM‐related mortality
From the first study in 1958, until the 1990s, studies of HCM typically estimated annual
mortality rates of between 3% and 6% (Maron et al., 1999). These were strongly influenced by
selection bias. Subsequent studies suggested an annual mortality rate of about 1%, and this was
used by Howard (2014). However, there are two reasons to believe that the 1% annual mortality
rate is considerably overstated.
(a) Studies of HCM‐related mortality take the form of survival analyses, which measure time
under observation until an endpoint is reached. The endpoint of interest is, clearly, death.
But virtually all studies used an endpoint which counted certain nonfatal events as well,
such as a resuscitated cardiac arrest.17 Such “non‐fatal deaths” have to be removed from the
mortality rates used for actuarial purposes.
(b) Modern treatments have reduced HCM‐related mortality even since the 1990s. Based on
very recent and large studies, with “non‐fatal deaths” removed, Haçarız (2020) estimated an
annual mortality rate of 0.55% (see Footnote 20).
5.2.2 | Falling estimates of disease penetrance
We note in the Appendix, point (e), that the population prevalence of clinical HCM has been
estimated to be 0.2% but that the population prevalence of known HCM‐related DVs has been
estimated to be about 0.6%, both based on unselected populations so not subject to selection or
ascertainment bias. Allowing for as‐yet‐unidentified DVs the population prevalence of HCM‐
related DVs could be as high as 1%.
This implies that the true population penetrance of HCM DVs—that is, the probability that the
disorder will appear in a DV carrier's lifetime—may be very much lower than current estimates based
on studies of persons with clinical HCM. The same applies for estimates of mortality rates.
5.3 | Consequences for life insurers and STOLI investors
It is evident that the results of an actuarial study into adverse selection, based on genetic
epidemiology, will depend strongly on what stage has been reached in the evolution of the
epidemiology. For example, Macdonald et al. (2003) in a study of breast and ovarian cancer
suggested reducing the empirical penetrances by 50–75% to allow for ascertainment bias.
Lemaire et al. (2000) said, in another study of breast and ovarian cancer:
17For example, Elliott et al. (2006), Maron et al. (2013, 2015, 2016).
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The results of our research should be applied with caution. They are based on the most
recent data available from the medical literature, but new medical articles are pub-
lished regularly that often provide very different estimates of BC and OC risks,
depending on the demographic group studied. For instance, estimates of the lifetime
probability of developing ovarian cancer for a woman with a BRCA1 mutation range
from 11% to 84%. Also, there might be a systematic bias in medical studies due to
the selection of the sample, usually families with a strong family history.
It would be very difficult to make reliable forecasts of the future penetrance and mortality
associated with a single‐gene disorder, when the epidemiology is imperfect, evolving and un-
known possible treatments lie in the future. However, we can make two practical observations.
(a) A life insurer who uses up‐to‐date epidemiology to calculate premiums (based on family
history when genetic test results may not be used) will almost certainly arrive at premiums
that are on the safe side, possibly extremely so.
(b) A STOLI investor who finances the large‐scale purchase of life insurance policies by carriers
of DVs will have to pay these safe‐side premiums. Then the investor faces all the risks
associated with true penetrance and mortality being overstated in the epidemiology, and
effective treatments being developed. Unless the investor can offload its risk onto other
investors, perhaps through securitization, it will face these risks for decades.
Haçarız et al. (2020) modelled HCM and adverse selection,18 and in particular considered
the possibility of an insurer basing premium rates19 on epidemiology that was subject to se-
lection or ascertainment biases, while an investor tried to exploit the insurer by funding adverse
selection. They also considered the possibility that family history may not be used. Our figures
are taken from table 8 in Haçarız et al. (2020).
To represent the insurer's assumptions, we use the annual HCMmortality rate of 1% (widely
cited and assumed by Howard, 2014).20 To represent the “true” annual HCM mortality rate we
use the more recent estimate of 0.55% (see Section 5.2.1), while noting that this too is based on
studies from which it is unlikely that all biases have been eliminated.
The “cost” of adverse selection is defined as that uniform percentage increase in all pre-
miums that would compensate for the insurance losses caused by adverse selection, after the
insurer has charged everyone actuarially fair premiums on the basis of all information it is
allowed to use.
(a) First, Table 1 considers the effect of precautionary adverse selection only, that is, insurance
meeting a need and not as a financial gamble. “Mild” adverse selection means twice as
18The model was a multiple‐state model (Macdonald et al., 2018) in which the following events in an individual life
history were represented by transitions between states: taking a genetic test; purchasing life insurance; fatal and
nonfatal HCM‐related events; and normal mortality. The life histories of all the members of a nuclear family were
modelled simultaneously, allowing family medical history to be used by insurers in underwriting.
19The relevant premium rates are those charged to persons with a family history of HCM. In line with UK practice,
Haçarız et al. (2020) assumed that persons with a negative genetic test result would be offered the normal premium
rates, ignoring the presence of a family history. This assumption is conservative.
20In our model, “rate” always means a transition intensity, analogous to the actuary's force of mortality (Macdonald
et al., 2018). Howard (2014) used “rate” to mean the probability of dying over 1 year. The consequences of this
distinction are not material for the numerical results and we prefer not to burden the reader with it in the text.
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many people as normal21 buy insurance after testing, “severe” means five times as many.
In all cases the percentage costs are small but negative. This means that the premiums the
insurer is charging are more than adequate to meet the risk, because of the upward bias in
the epidemiology upon which they relied. Since the investor faces cashflows that are the
mirror image of the insurer's, they make a loss, because they are paying high premiums but
death claims are fewer than expected.
(b) Next, we note that the same level of adverse selection superimposed on a much smaller
insurance market should, in principle, have a proportionately greater effect. To that end,
Table 2 simulates a smaller market,22 in which the normal rate of insurance purchase is five
times less than in Table 1. “Mild” adverse selection again means being twice as likely to buy
insurance, but “severe” adverse selection now means 25 times more likely. The percentage
premium increases are again negative, but not very different from those in Table 1. The reason
is that insurers may not know genetic test results, but they are not completely ignorant. They
can calculate premium rates allowing for some proportion of insurance purchasers being
carriers of HCM‐related DVs. If they can use family history in underwriting, they can do this
with greater accuracy, which is why these results are more consistent.
(c) Finally we add speculative adverse selection, in Table 3. This takes the “small market”
assumptions of Table 2 to model precautionary adverse selection and assumes that “adverse
selectors” take out sums insured 10 times normal. Now, in the most extreme case when
family history cannot be used, we do get a larger increase in premiums to meet adverse
selection costs. If family history can be used, however, then the insurer is well‐protected.
In fact, the more adverse selection behavior the better.
Of course, excess profit for the insurer means that policyholders are paying more than their
risk warrants, in statistical terms. We do not suggest the life insurer does this on purpose,
although it may set out to price this insurance cautiously. The point is that a STOLI investor
funding the large‐scale purchase of life insurance on the terms offered would have cashflows
that were the mirror image of the life insurer's, leading to a loss. This illustrates the risks that a
STOLI investor might run if it tried to exploit adverse selection based on genetic tests.
TABLE 1 Examples of percentage increases in premiums when the insurer calculates premiums using
epidemiology subject to upward bias
Premium increases with




Note: The rate at which insurance is purchased “normally” is high, representing a large insurance market.
Source: Haçarız et al. (2020).
21The “normal” rate of purchase is represented by a transition intensity of 0.05 per annum; approximately, 5% of
uninsured individuals buy insurance in any year. This represents a large insurance market.
22Represented by a transition intensity of 0.01 per annum.
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6 | CONCLUSIONS
6.1 | Genetic testing and adverse selection
Life insurers' concerns about their exposure to adverse selection if they are unable to ask about
genetic test results known to applicants have been expressed for nearly 30 years. If high adverse
selection costs are to arise, it would seem to be due mainly to speculative adverse selection.
Therefore, in this paper we have considered three questions.
(a) Would individuals who have an adverse genetic test result be likely, as a result, to take out
abnormally large life insurance policies?
(b) Would third parties such as LSCs be likely or able to finance large‐scale speculative adverse
selection?
(c) Does genetic epidemiology provide sufficient certainty about the risks conferred by carrying
a DV to justify the outlay of money on a gamble, as in (a) or (b) above?
We summarize our answers to these questions in the following sections.
6.2 | Individuals: The one‐shot gamble
For individuals with private knowledge of an adverse genetic test, life insurance might be
framed as a speculative product; that is a bet against the insurer at a cheap price. This is always
TABLE 2 Examples of percentage increases in premiums when the insurer calculates premiums using
epidemiology subject to upward bias
Premium increases with




Note: The rate at which insurance is purchased “normally” is low, representing a small insurance market.
Source: Haçarız et al. (2020).
TABLE 3 Examples of percentage increases in premiums when the insurer calculates premiums using
epidemiology subject to upward bias
Premium increases with




Note: The rate at which insurance is purchased “normally” is low, representing a small insurance market. “Adverse selectors”
take out sums insured of ten times normal.
Source: Haçarız et al. (2020).
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a one‐shot gamble: individuals cannot diversify risk by making the same bet many times; they
can make the bet only once.
This particular one‐shot gamble is usually a gamble against relatively long odds. For term
insurance, despite increased mortality, the individual is still typically very likely to survive the
entire term. For whole‐life insurance, the economic gain is large only if the individual dies
before too many premiums have been paid.
In most realistic scenarios involving an a"bdverse genetic test, this combination of features—
inability to diversify, and long odds—make the one‐shot gamble an unattractive prospect for a large
bet by a single individual.
6.3 | Third parties: LSCs and STOLI
One way to overcome the long odds of a one‐shot gamble on genetic information would be
to turn it into a many‐shot gamble. LSCs23 possibly could do this, by financing the pur-
chase of life insurance policies, but a completely new business model would be needed,
targeting individuals with much longer LEs and smaller probabilities of premature death,
and initiating new policies (STOLI). Combining the double rarity of wealthy individuals
and individuals who carry a DV, it is unlikely that a sufficiently large market exists for
STOLI investors.
The legal system in the United States offers some defences against STOLI, ultimately relying
on insurable interest, and U.S. courts have, in recent years, invalidated large numbers of STOLI
policies. Despite the concerns expressed in the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (2014) report, we
have found no public record of STOLI activity in Canada comparable to that in the United
States.
6.4 | Relying on genetic epidemiology for a financial gamble
In Section 5, we described the typical evolution of the epidemiology of an inherited disorder,
and in particular the fact that much of it is based on studies of selected (clinically affected)
populations and is subject to selection and ascertainment biases.
Consequently, the mortality risk associated with a DV may be imperfectly described by
currently available epidemiology, especially if the DV is known only on the basis of DNA
sequence. Ancillary information such as family history might improve the estimation of the
associated risk, but might also be disclosable to a life insurer, increasing the premiums and
reducing the payoff of the gamble.
Moreover, since policies with very long terms are needed to increase the likelihood of a
payout, two more, implicit, assumptions come into play, namely: (a) that today's epide-
miology will be reliably stable over the policy terms; and (b) that medical advances will
not significantly reduce mortality. These seem risky assumptions for the long term. In the
end, investing in life policies on the basis of genetic tests is a bet against the long‐term
progress of medical science.
23VCs, with their extremely short time horizons, are not relevant.
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APPENDIX A
An Example: Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy (HCM)
Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy (HCM) was a significant source of adverse selection costs in
Howard (2014), and was studied in more detail in Haçarız (2020), and we use it to give
numerical examples in this paper. Standard references on HCM are Elliott et al. (2014) and
Gersh et al. (2011). Haçarız (2020) summarized the aspects of actuarial interest.
(a) Physiology: HCM is thickening of the muscle wall of the left ventricle of the heart.
(b) Clinical Definition: HCM is deemed to be clinically present if the left ventricular wall
thickness (LVWT) exceeds 13–15mm. This criterion for onset is often met in adolescence or
early adulthood. Clinical HCM may be present but “silent”—symptomless and undetected.
(c) Risk: HCM presents significant risk of sudden cardiac arrest (SCA), heart failure, and (at
older ages) stroke.
(d) Genetics: HCM is caused by mutations in any of several genes encoding for sarcomere
proteins. All are dominantly inherited. Mutations accounting for about 1/4 to 1/3 of HCM
have yet to be identified but are presumed to exist.
(e) Prevalence: The prevalence of clinical HCM is estimated to be about 0.2%, but the
prevalence of known mutations has been estimated to be about 0.6%, implying that
the prevalence of all mutations may approach 1%.
(f) Penetrance: The penetrance of HCM mutations has been estimated to be 69%, but that
estimate is quite old and predates the discovery that mutations have much higher pre-
valence than does clinical HCM (see (e) above). When clinical HCM does develop, it does so
before age 20–30 in most cases.
(g) Mortality: The annual mortality rate from HCM is widely quoted to be 1%, but this is
potentially misleading as the endpoints used in survival analyses of HCM invariably include
nonfatal as well as fatal events. Based on recent large studies an annual mortality rate of
0.55% was estimated by Haçarız (2020) (see Footnote 20).
(h) Genetic Testing for HCM: Cascade genetic testing (CGT) is used in HCM, rather than any
form of screening. CGT works as follows.
(1) An individual, who is a member of a family with no history of HCM being present,
develops a heart problem (possibly fatal).
(2) HCM is diagnosed and a known HCM‐related mutation is identified. The individual is
then called the “proband” or “index case.”
(3) All first‐degree relatives of the proband have a 50% chance of also carrying the muta-
tion. They are all offered genetic testing.
(4) If any of those tested do carry the mutation, then all of their untested first‐degree
relatives also have a 50% chance of carrying the mutation, so they are offered genetic
testing, and so on.
(5) In this way, testing can “cascade” through an extended family.
(i) Epidemiology: Virtually all epidemiology of HCM is based on selected populations, that is,
individuals with clinical HCM. The prevalence estimates mentioned in (e) above are ex-
ceptions. Estimates of penetrance and mortality rates are likely to be subject to selection
and ascertainment biases.
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